The European Commission, including Andrius Kubilius (second from left), commissioned for defense and space, plan to pushing an EU Space Act in the coming weeks. (credit: EC - Audiovisual Service)

Preparing for the EU Space Act and its potential influence on the future of space traffic management

by Michael P. Gleason
Monday, March 31, 2025

The European Union (EU) expects to release the first EU Space Act in the second quarter of 2025.[1] It will likely require non-EU commercial space companies providing satellite services within the EU marketplace, including US companies, to comply with the law and regulations it will impose.[2]

While the draft law is being closely held by the EU, analysis of its foundational documents and senior EU leader statements makes it possible to anticipate its objectives and priorities and to make a reasonable prediction of the types of requirements the law will impose on European, US, and other commercial space operators. For example, the 2022 EU Approach for Space Traffic Management notes the critical importance of space traffic management (STM) for space safety, security, and sustainability. The approach calls for the EU’s European Commission (EC) to develop enabling legislation for STM-related binding obligations and nonbinding measures on satellite operators while proposing several potential areas for binding regulations.

Second, the inaugural EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, released in March 2023, builds directly on the 2022 EU Approach for Space Traffic Management, calls for the EC to propose an EU space law, and suggests several additional areas in which binding regulation is needed. Highlighted herein, the release of the EU Space Act may represent a significant inflection point in global space sustainability and space traffic management approaches.

The EU has multiple purposes for the emerging EU Space Act. First, the EU’s overarching goal for its space-related ambitions is strategic autonomy.[3] The EU considers its ability to influence hard international space law, rules, and regulations as well as voluntary international standards, best practices, and norms—so they align with EU interests—as a key component of strategic autonomy.[4] Next, in alignment with the EU’s traditional role in creating a single market among its member states, the law will remove fragmentation among 12 different EU member state national-level space laws and will safeguard and improve the functioning of the EU internal market for space activities.[5] The EU expects the law to provide a stable, predictable, and competitive business environment within Europe.[6] Moreover, the law will provide a common framework that ensures a consistent EU-wide approach to space safety and sustainability issues while addressing the growing space debris problem and the environmental impact of space activities.

The EU is a large stakeholder in space safety and sustainability due to it owning and operating the Galileo satellite constellation, the Copernicus space system with its Sentinel satellites, and its future large constellation of low Earth orbit (LEO) broadband satellites called IRIS².[7] Finally, paraphrasing an EU official’s remarks, the EU is emphasizing hard law, rules, and regulations because they want to be able to tell their grandchildren that they did everything they could to protect the sustainability and usability of the space environment when there was still a chance. Given current trends, there is no time to dither and hope voluntary measures are sufficient to address growing space sustainability and safety issues.[8]

“Smart regulation and competitiveness go hand in hand.”[9]
– Andrius Kubilius, February 14, 2025.

The EU understands the risk that the EU’s more regulatory, legally binding approach may create obstacles for emerging enterprises and motivate commercial space companies to take their business elsewhere. The EU hopes to avoid creating such obstacles and reactions.[10] To that end, the EU Space Act also will apply to any space system operating in the EU (whether EU or non-EU) or providing services there, ensuring a level playing field for the EU in the global marketplace for space, and discouraging space companies from moving their activities to another country. Indeed, the EU Space Act is expected to require US commercial space companies providing satellite services within the EU market to comply with the law and regulations it will impose.[11]

The law and its emphasis on legal requirements, regulations, and obligatory standards may not align well with the United States’ preferred space traffic management approach that emphasizes voluntary standards, best practices, guidelines, and norms. When the EU Space Act goes into effect, the law will change the trajectory of the global conversation about how to protect the sustainability of space from an emphasis on voluntary approaches—favored by the United States—to more consideration of mandated solutions, and the best balance between those two approaches. More broadly, the EU Space Act could have implications for how global space governance evolves in the coming years and for the United States’ ability to shape that process and its outcomes.

Introducing the European space sector

The EU Space Act is coming from the European Commission, the EU executive branch equivalent. Ever since the EU began pursuing its space ambitions in the 1990s, space activities within Europe have been framed as existing at three distinct levels: (1) European, (2) intergovernmental organization, and (3) national (individual countries). It is important to understand the differences among these levels to fully grasp the source of the EU Space Act and its likely impact within the EU and around the world. This brief uses this framework to reference associated activities at the various levels.

As shown in Table 1, the European level refers to the space activities that come under two areas of the EU. (A note on nomenclature: It is important to understand the difference between “European” or “Europe’s” general space activities and the specific space activities of the European Union as a distinct governmental entity.) First are the space activities conducted under the auspices of the EU’s executive arm, i.e., the European Commission (EC). The EC is a supranational organization that, based on the Treaty of Lisbon, is empowered to make political decisions and act in specifically identified areas (e.g., EU internal market regulations, tariffs, and space activities, among others) without additional EU member state approval. In effect, the EC is an independent European political power with a standalone budget. Checks and balances (as thought of in US government nomenclature) on EC activities and expenditures are provided by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

Table 1: A Framework for Understanding Space Activities in Europe

*The EU Space Act is expected to be finalized in the second quarter of 2025.

In addition, some EU space activities with more direct security and defense purposes (such as the EU Satellite Center which provides geospatial intelligence) fall under the auspices of a separate EU arm called the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In contrast with EC activities, EU member states maintain a more direct role in CFSP decisions and funding.

The Intergovernmental Organization level (IGO level) is inhabited by two different organizations: ESA and European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). In these IGOs, each of the organizations’ member states has an equal voice in decisions. ESA and EUMETSAT are not empowered to make political decisions. While ESA provides first-class space technology and capabilities and runs sophisticated, large-scale space projects, ESA can embark on individual space projects only within narrow limits or if specifically approved and funded by ESA Member States.

Importantly, ESA is not part of the European Union and is not subject to EU law.[12] ESA also has its own unique funding mechanisms, and, while there is overlap among EU member states and ESA member states, not all ESA member states are members of the EU, such as the United Kingdom and Canada.[13] The relationship between the EU and ESA is defined in the 2004 EU-ESA Framework Agreement.[14]

Observers must not make the mistake of conflating the European level and IGO level, the organizations at each level, and their respective space activities. In fact, significant friction often exists between the EC and ESA even though they share the same industrial base and work closely together to advance European space activities.

The National level is where European countries’ individual space programs and space agencies—funded by national budgets—reside in this framework, with France, Germany, and Italy representing the largest national space programs in Europe.

Returning the discussion to the European level, the EC Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) oversees the EU space policy, strategy, and law. DG DEFIS also manages the development, deployment, and use of EU space assets, including Galileo and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) programs; the Copernicus space-based Earth observation program; the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) Partnership; and the GOVSATCOM and IRIS² communication satellite programs. As the overall program manager, DG DEFIS implements the EU Space Programme through the EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA).[15]

The EU Space Programme’s three flagship satellite programs, operated by EUSPA, are (1) Galileo, a global satellite navigation and positioning system similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS); (2) Copernicus, an Earth observation system; and (3) the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service, a regional satellite-based PNT augmentation system similar to the US Wide Area Augmentation System.

In early 2022, the European Commission (EC) proposed two new flagship programs related to space. The first new initiative is the development of IRIS², an EU funded, developed, and operated large low Earth orbit (LEO) constellation to enable secure, high-speed broadband everywhere in Europe (and implicitly around the globe). The second program is to establish an EU space traffic management (STM) approach with the ambition to “be at the forefront of the development of STM guidelines and standards.”[16]

Altogether, the EU spends about $3 billion a year on the space activities outlined above, making them a major stakeholder in space and providing them the motivation to develop the EU Space Act.[17] Some observers forecast the EU will more than double that investment soon, making space safety and sustainability an imperative and illuminating their high interest in space traffic management

Sources and drivers

The February 2022 EU Approach for Space Traffic Management and the March 2023 EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense are driving and shaping the EU Space Act. The EU Approach for Space Traffic Management emphasizes the critical importance of STM for space safety, security, and sustainability. The approach calls for the EC to develop enabling legislation for STM-related nonbinding measures and binding obligations on satellite operators. Most interestingly, the approach includes the possibility of imposing future EU STM legal requirements and mandatory standards on any satellite operator providing services within the EU.[18]

The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence followed a year later, recognizing space threats to EU and member state space assets and the importance of resilient space systems. Building directly on the EU STM approach, the strategy calls for the EC to propose an EU space law that provides a common framework within the EU for security, safety, and sustainability in space. The strategy’s goal is to enable the EU to deter hostile activities in space, to protect its space assets, defend its interests, and strengthen its strategic posture and autonomy.[19] The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense explains that a standard approach across the EU is needed to share information across EU Member States to enable EU-wide cooperation during space security incidents.

More recently, in September 2024, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the EC, directed the newly designated EC commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius, to “lead the work on a future proposal for an EU Space Law. In this context, as proposed in the Draghi report, you will work to introduce common EU standards and rules for space activities and harmonise licensing requirements.”[20]

The so-called Draghi report, The Future of European Competitiveness, released earlier in September 2024, proposed the EU “establish a functioning Single Market for space, through a common EU legislative framework. Introduce common standards and harmonise licensing requirements in Member States, so that products and solutions comply with the same requirements (i.e. in line with the planned EU Space Law). Necessary EU legislation should ensure EU sovereignty concerning standards and norm-setting in this strategic policy field.”

In November 2024, during a EU Parliamentary hearing—in the context of a question regarding the EU space law—Andrius Kubilius expressed, “we hope that, with our initiative, we can start to be again in some way standard setters globally in trying to really push forward for some kind of international agreements on the space rules.”[21] He predicted the EU space law would come in the first half of 2025. That time frame was confirmed in the EC’s January 2025, A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, which renamed the “EU Space Law” to the “EU Space Act” and specified the EU Space Act should come in the second quarter 2025.”[22] After a year of delay caused by the 2024 EU elections, the selection of new EU leadership, and perhaps some internal EU debate, the EU Space Act may soon be at hand.

In the meantime, the draft law is being closely held by the EC with few details publicly revealed. However, close examination of the 2022 EU Approach for Space Traffic Management and the 2023 EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense, as well as statements from senior EU officials and the press, provide a general sense of the areas the law may cover and what the law may include regarding space safety, sustainability, and STM. From this analysis, observers may anticipate that the EU Space Act will rebalance the international conversation about how to best address growing space sustainability and space traffic management issues somewhat away from an almost exclusive focus on nonbinding measures toward more consideration of binding measures.

Analysis and key findings

The analysis found several potential STM-related, top-level, legally binding measures and standards that may be mandated by the EU Space Act. The list combines statements from the 2022 EU Approach for Space Traffic Management, the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, senior EU leaders’ statements, and predictions from media and other observers. While the list reflects only top-level STM-related areas, each of the potential areas identified below implies numerous material investments and potentially a list of several hundred binding STM-related sub-measures. In short, each top-level measure listed below could indicate areas in which satellite operators may need to expend resources broadly and deeply to align with the law. Such a detailed list would be exceedingly speculative, however, and beyond the scope of this analysis. The list does not present these potential binding measures in any chronological order but organizes them into six bins.

From a synthesis of the information extracted from the sources, we can forecast that the EU Space Act could require the following STM-related compulsory rules:

• Collision avoidance binding measures: (The EU considers collision avoidance services to be a government responsibility)
• Establishment of minimum requirements for collision avoidance. For example:
• Mandating use of active tracking devices on satellites.
• Systemized notifications and warnings of any major incident or reentry.
• Commercial satellite operators subscribe to a collision avoidance service at least to a similar level of performance as current EU Space Surveillance and Tracking partnership.
• Standardized EU criteria for launch, collision avoidance, and reentry licensing.
• Commercial entities that provide collision avoidance services for satellite operators maintain communication mechanisms and contacts (i.e., operators’ directory) for managing conjunction events with satellite operators and other collision avoidance service providers.
• Manufacturers and operators prove compliance with the technical standards and guidelines developed by European standardization organizations, including EU-level STM standards and guidelines such as guidelines for special cases of STM (for instance, non-maneuverable satellites or constellations).
• Information-sharing binding measures:
• Mandatory information-sharing regarding anomalies and security incidents that signal a space threat.
• Mandatory warning of any major incident or reentry.
• Cybersecurity mandated measures as part of the design of all space systems delivering essential services:
• Specific cybersecurity standards and procedures in the space domain.
• Cybersecurity hardening requirements and standards across the supply chain.
• Cyber incident monitoring, assessment, information sharing, and reporting.
• Security and resilience mandated requirements:
• All space systems delivering critical space services will include security considerations in their systems design.
• All space systems delivering critical space services will have a minimum level of security, including cybersecurity, and a minimum level of resilience.
• Require companies to mitigate risks by conducting assessments and evaluating potential events threatening their infrastructure.
• EU Member States could be required to:
• Identify their essential space systems and services.
• Establish security monitoring centers to allow for the notification of security incidents in a systematic manner.
• Identify major supply chain actors.
• Define and implement a common minimum level of resilience for critical space services.
• Develop coordinated national preparedness and resilience plans and emergency protocols.
• Launch, collision avoidance, and reentry licensing requirements:
• Standardized EU criteria for launch, collision avoidance, and reentry licensing.
• Mandatory minimum deorbiting standards.
• Environmental standards:
• Standards to curb light pollution or optical interference caused by growing satellite constellations.
• Limit greenhouse gas emissions and pollution caused by rocket launches.

Why it matters

Even if only a handful of the above binding measures are adopted in the final EU Space Act, it will mark and accelerate a shift in the direction of the global conversation about how to best protect the sustainability of the space domain and manage space traffic. For the last couple of decades, the discussion has been dominated almost exclusively with initiatives that focused on voluntary, nonbinding standards, guidelines, best practices, and norms of responsible behavior, like the failed International Code of Conduct and the slow implementation of the United Nations (UN) Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

These strategies are driven by the fear that binding regulation will crush emerging, innovative, space companies and drive them offshore to countries that impose fewer legal burdens, which has been an effective threat during an era of low trade barriers. In such an environment, incentivizing compliance with voluntary measures has involved developing international norms of behavior by which compliance would win praise and deviant behavior would be shamed. Other incentives to comply include such measures as “space sustainability” ratings.[23] In addition, a variety of organizations have been formed to focus on identifying safe and sustainable practices in orbit and encouraging their members to voluntarily follow agreed upon best practices and guidelines. These factors combined to cause the quick dismissal of proposals and deter consideration of concepts for space safety and sustainability that go outside the bounds of voluntary measures.

Binding measures to protect space sustainability are not unprecedented, however. The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requires that non-US licensed systems meet the same orbital debris mitigation standards as US licensed systems and imposed its first-ever penalty for noncompliance with the standards in October 2023 when it fined DISH (a US company) $150,000. The EU Space Act’s imposition of more binding regulations across a broad spectrum of space activity, with potentially significant penalties for non-compliance, will rebalance the scale and make hard law options previously considered untenable more available to governments. While voluntary constraints will continue to be important, the EU Space Act will increase the range of plausible solutions for addressing space safety and operational sustainability challenges.

Standard setting

EU ambitions include demonstrating leadership in global STM standards development and promoting standards internationally that reflect EU values.[24] The 2023 EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense says better EU representation is crucial in international standardization organizations. The 2022 EU Approach for Space Traffic Management calls for the EU to be proactive and at the forefront of setting international STM standards. To enable this ambition, the EU has established a forum called “The STM Stakeholder Mechanism,” which aggregates EU member state and other stakeholder requirements, synthesizes stakeholder views, coordinates external engagement, and promotes the EU STM approach internationally.[25] The forthcoming EU Space Act likely will contain provisions to further enable these ambitions.

International stakeholders recognize that often a fruitful path for safeguarding space safety and sustainability involves a three-step process. First, that the expert community, including heavy governmental representation, develop voluntary, technical, and operational standards for specific space activities. As the voluntary standards gain traction among stakeholders over time, governments around the world begin to incorporate the standards into domestic law, regulation, and licensing criteria. Eventually, internationally congruent domestic law and customary practices emerge, creating favorable conditions for a binding international agreement or precluding the need for such an agreement altogether.

For example, the United States and 13 other nations that are major space actors, as well as European Space Agency (ESA) member states, have incorporated space debris mitigation standards into their domestic regulation and law based on voluntary UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) space debris mitigation guidelines and related International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards, specifically ISO Standard 24113.[26] In this way, voluntary standards can morph into binding, domestic legal requirements. The EU Space Act will likely contain provisions that seek to leverage this process—influencing the voluntary STM-related standards approved by international standard setting organizations—recognizing that shaping the standards process from the beginning begets the ability to lead development of additional concrete global STM approaches.[27]

As the EU grows more experienced in aggregating the preferred standards of the EU member states and those of other European stakeholders, shaping international standards provides an avenue for the EU to protect space safety and sustainability beyond voluntary approaches.

Conclusion

Combined with rising trade barriers, which will lower incentives for space companies moving offshore and defang threats to do so, policymakers around the world may become more openminded toward legally binding space sustainability and safety measures, and the best balance between voluntary measures and binding measures. Even if the EU Space Act does not include every measure identified in the analysis of the source documents and senior leader statements above, just the fact that the EU Space Act establishes some binding measures regarding collision avoidance, information sharing, cybersecurity, and other space activities will break with past reluctance to go down that path and establish a new model. The United States and other stakeholders will find new challenges to their preference for laissez faire-driven space traffic management and space sustainability policies.

References

1. European Commission, “A Competitiveness Compass for the EU,” January 29, 2025.
2. Michael Gleason and Catrina Melograna, Anticipating the New European Space Law, The Aerospace Corporation, October 2024.
3. Daniel Fiott, “The European Space Sector as an Enabler of EU Strategic Autonomy,” European Parliament. Belgium: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2020, 7.
4. Daniel Fiott, “The European Space Sector as an Enabler of EU Strategic Autonomy,” European Parliament. Belgium: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2020, 10.
5. EC, “A Competitiveness Compass for the EU,” Jan 29, 2025.
6. EC, Commission work programme 2025 , February 11, 2025.
7. European Union Agency for the Space Program, “About EUSPA.”
8. European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management,” JOIN (2022), 4 final. (February 15, 2022).
9. European Commission, “Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the official Munich Security Conference Space Night Munich,” February 14, 2025.
10. Hearing of Andrius Kubilius – Commissioner-Designate – Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (Defence and Space), November 6, 2024..
11. Michael Gleason and Catrina Melograna, Anticipating the New European Space Law, The Aerospace Corporation, October 2024.
12. “Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 170/77, 8.
13. “Member States and Cooperating States,” The European Space Agency.
14. 20th Anniversary of the EU/ESA Framework Agreement, ESA, May 20, 2024.
15. Mission Letter from Ursula Von der Leyen to Andrius Kubilius Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space September 17, 2024.
16. Michael Gleason and Catrina Melograna, Anticipating the New European Space Law, The Aerospace Corporation, October 2024, 3.
17. Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, Part B, Section 1, Chapter 8, Space, September 2024, 179.
18. European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management,” JOIN (2022), 4 final. (February 15, 2022.)
19. European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence, JOIN (2023), 9 final. (March 10, 2023).
20. Mission Letter from Ursula Von der Leyen to Andrius Kubilius Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, September 17, 2024.
21. Hearing of Andrius Kubilius – Commissioner-Designate – Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (Defence and Space), November 6, 2024.
22. EC, “A Competitiveness Compass for the EU,” January 29, 2025, 8.
23. Space Sustainability Rating, https://spacesustainabilityrating.org/.
24. European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management,” JOIN (2022), 4 final. (February 15, 2022). 10.
25. STM Stakeholder Mechanism.
26. Michael Gleason, Establishing Space Traffic Management Standards, Guidelines and Best Practices, The Aerospace Corporation, September 2, 2019, 4.
27. Ibid.

Dr. Michael P. Gleason is a national security senior project engineer in The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy. Prior to joining Aerospace, he supported the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment as a senior strategic space analyst. He served 29 years in the Air Force and is an accomplished national security space expert with experience in space policy, strategy, satellite operations, and international affairs. While in the Air Force, he served for five years at the Pentagon and for two years at the Department of State. He is the lead author of the 2013 Air Force Space Policy and co-author of NASA’s congressionally directed 2016 Space Traffic Management Study.

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